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Abstract
This Article is based on the inviolability of the legal principles underlying rule of law and
explores the ways in which various governments have responded. In addition, it considers the
importance of the legislative processes, recognizing that the failure to honor them leaves open the
door to executive exploitation and the misuse of power. It also reflects on the efficiency of anti-
terrorist legislation. Does this legislation stop, deter or punish criminals; is it “comfort legislation”
directed towards producing and maintaining public confidence; or is it counter-productive through
the alienation of innocent victims and ethnic, religious and immigrant groups?
EMERGENCY AND
ANTI-TERRORIST POWERS
9/11: USA AND UK
Philip A. Thomas*
"Amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent, they may be changed,
but they speak the same language in war as in peace.
INTRODUCTION
The murder of some 3,000 people in New York, Washington
and Pennsylvania, on September 11th by suicidal terrorists pro-
foundly affected the American psyche.2 Political seismic shock
waves reverberated around the globe and governments lined up
behind President Bush's swift declaration of "war on terrorism."
This Article addresses the terms of that declaration by reviewing
the process of good governance alongside the executive and leg-
islative responses in the United States and the United Kingdom
("UK").
In times of social, economic, and political calm the applica-
* I wish to recognize the support of the Research Committee of Cardiff Law
School for providing funds that allowed me to benefit from the student research sup-
port of Kirat Nagra, now of New Delhi and Ashima Arora, now of Houston, Texas. In
addition, I thank Colm Campbell and Ita Connolly for allowing me to quote from their
forthcoming paper, A Useful Model: Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Powers in Northern Ireland,
and also, David Campbell and Paddy Hillyard for constructive comments. This Article
was completed in January 2003 and is an updated, expanded, and amended version of
September I lth and Good Governance, N.I. L.Q. 386 (2002).
1. Lord Atkin, Liversidge v. Anderson, [1941] 2 All E.R. 612. This is a dissenting
judgment for, in essence, the House of Lords stated that it is not for the courts to
interfere with the Executive in security matters in wartime. "History teaches that grave
threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when ... rights seem too extravagant
to endure . . . When we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of
real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it . . . The first, and worst,
casualty . . . will be the precious liberties of our citizens." Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n. 489, U.S. 602, 635-36 (1989) (Marshall J., also, like Lord Atkin, a
dissenting judgment).
2. The American press carried statements such as: "In a few minutes the world
changed" and not just the world, "a universe is now lost." SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec.
30, 2001. Between 1966 and 1999, there were 3,636 deaths in Northern Ireland related
to political violence. See DAVID MCKIrrRICK ET AL., LOST Liv S (1999).
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tion of good governance is relatively easy. But in times of unrest,
war, and emergency the extraordinary problems that arise test
the mechanics and durability of good governance: Essentially,
do the responses to September 1 1th constitute good governance
by observing the rule of law?4 Should these responses fail this
test, how do they fare when examined under different criteria:
specifically, criminal justice efficiency? What does a cost-benefit
analysis of these responses tell us?
In a world dominated by one superpower, that power may,
in large part, choose between proceeding on the basis of law or
on the basis of pure political, economic, and military power
though possibly involving a symbolic genuflection to interna-
tional law. However, if a country is uninterested in the develop-
ment of an international criminal court, declares itself not
bound by international treaties' or important bilateral agree-
ments concerning the protection of the environment, and
moves against international violence with scant regard to estab-
lished legal principles, then the rule of law is downgraded to a
secondary position to be used only when politically expedient.
Further, in moments of crisis the elision of law and politics is
fractured, and unobserved stress lines become a public specta-
cle.
Nevertheless, in modern democratic States that operate
under the rule of law, the criminal justice system is subject to
certain expectations. These include the principles of reasonable
3. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (forthcoming). 0.
GROSS & FIONNUALA N( AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN COMPAR-
ATIVE AND THFORETICAL PERSPECTIVE (2003).
4. THE WORLD DFVELOPMENTI REPORT, published annually by the World Bank, con-
sistently recognizes and affirms that establishing the rule of law is one of the five funda-
mental tasks, which governments must perform. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVEI.OPMENT
REPORT, 4 (1997). The OECD recognizes that democracy, good governance, and the
rule of law are central to the achievement of the development goals of the 21 st century.
OECD, FINAL REPORT OF THE An Hoc WORKINc GROUP ON PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENI
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE (1997). Good governance is seen as including support for the
rule of law. See SusrAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 20 (Konrad Gin-
ther, Erik Denters & Paul de Waart eds., 2000). See generally R. A. W. RHODES, UNDER-
STANDING GOVERNANCE, POLICY NETWORKS, ETC. (1997); N. DouCLAs LEWIS, LAW AND
GOVERNANCE (2001).
5. For example, in December 2001 President Bush pulled out of the ABM treaty
with Russia saying: "it hinders us from developing an anti-missile shield that will deter
an attack from a rogue [S]tate." N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001. See also, Costas Douzinas,
Postmodern Just Wars: Kosovo, Afghanistan and the New World Order, in LAW AnrER GROUND
ZERO 20 (John Strawson ed., 2002).
9/11: USA AND UK
cause; no detention without trial; habeas corpus; innocent until
proven guilty; an open trial in a judicial court; legal advice and
representation of choice; and punishment reflecting the serious-
ness of the crime. These principles are sometimes blurred at
their edges but they should be expected and present in matters
of crime control.
The total immersion of society in legal culture is nowhere
better illustrated than in the United States. A century and a half
ago, de Tocqueville wrote: "Scarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved sooner or later into a
judicial question."" More recently, Hartog has argued:
"Throughout American history law was inescapably, at times
overwhelmingly, present..."' As another observer put it: "The
United States has become probably the most law-run and lawyer-
run country in the history of mankind."8 The importance of law
as a cultural icon and the backbone of good governance cannot
be overemphasized.
However, a major exception may be found in times of na-
tional emergency. At such moments, executive action may be-
come the dominant force. The traditional triumveral balance
between the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive, be-
comes stressed and is reconfigured in the attempt to address the
crisis. The threat' or outbreak of war is the paradigm case that
produces challenges to good governance.' l The fear of gross
6. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1984).
7. Hendrik Hertog, Abigail Bailey's Coverture, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 107 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1993).
8. HAROLD BERMAN, WILLIAM GREINER & SAMIR SALIBA, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS
OF LAW 3 (1996). Today, there are over one million lawyers in the United States out of
a national workforce of some 110 million. Each year, the country's law schools gradu-
ate another fifty thousand lawyers, a number that roughly corresponds to the total num-
ber of lawyers in China. In two years, the U.S. law graduates outstrip the total number
of practicing lawyers in the United Kingdom ("UK").
9. For example, the Official Secrets Act 1911 was subject to hasty Parliamentary
consideration. J. Griffith, The Official Secrets Act, 273J. oF L. & Soc. 273 (1989). A more
recent illustration of this point was the emergency debate on April 3, 1982 over the
Falklands "war." It lasted three hours. Despite the request from a member of the
House of Commons, a five-hour debate was refused. See A. BARNETT, IRON BRITANNICA
23 (1982).
10. The best illustration is the work of ALFRED WILLIAM BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE
HIGI.nSTr DEGREE ODIoUs: DETENTION WITHOUTr TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN (1992). See
also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL TIE LAWS BUT ONE 218 (1998). "Without question, the
government's authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil liberty is greatest in
2003] 1195
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terrorist threats produces similar tensions and reactions."
Emergency legislation passed as a consequence of national
catastrophe associated with terrorism has a predictable pattern.
It involves an unseemly scramble between the Executive and leg-
islature so that they are seen by the public and the media to be
doing "something."' 2 A previously prepared emergency Bill is
dusted down and hastily pushed through the legislature.'" Pol-
icy and law are thereby tightened, with scant recourse to rea-
soned chamber debate or recognition of standard procedures,
in order to respond to the media and public outcry.' 4 Thus, the
politicians' anxiety to be viewed as resolving the crisis overrides
both established process and rational action. Indeed, such hasty
responses may even have a negative effect in isolating vulnerable
groups and disenchanting sections of society. The result is pre-
dictably disturbing: enhanced powers given to security agencies
and the police; deviation from established principles of law;
human rights abuses;' 5 alienation of innocent, affected people;' 6
time of declared war." See P. Smith, The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 3 WORKING PAPERS IN
EUROPEAN CRIMINOLOGY 208 (1982).
11. A recent and new illustration of the use of "national emergency" is the bio-
emergency associated with the foot and mouth epidemic in the UK During that pe-
riod, it is claimed that the rule of law and natural justice were suspended in order to
respond to the epidemic. See D. Campbell & R. G. Lee, Carnage by Computer: The Black-
board Economics of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Epidemic, in LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES (forth-
coming 2003). See also Bioterrorists May Mount Foot and Mouth Attack, OBSERVER, Jan. 5,
2003.
12. "At a time of threat, to be seen to be doing something rather than nothing is a
natural human - and perhaps particularly ministerial - reaction." Lord Jenkins of
Hillhead, House of Lords, Official Report, Nov. 27, 2001, col. 199.
13. Roy Jenkins, Home Secretary during 1974, wrote in his autobiography, A LIFE
AT THE CENTRE, that the Prevention of Terrorism [Temporary Provisions] Act 1974 was
constructed from contingency plans, which had been carefully prepared in advance.
ROYJENKINS, A LIFE AT THE CENTRE (1991). This advance provider approach was also
probably employed for the PATRIOT Act, given its size and the speed of its introduc-
tion as a Bill into Congress.
14. "Circumstances and public opinion demand urgent and appropriate action after
the September 11 th attacks." David Blunkett, House of Commons, Official Report, Dec.
19, 2001, col. 22 (emphasis added). Conspiracy theorists might argue that this is an
opportune moment to push through legislation, which in times of normality would not
receive the support of the legislature, nor that of the public at large.
15. See e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NORTHERN IRELAND: REPORT OF AN AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL MISSION, Al Index, EUR45/01/78 (1978); HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN IN NORTHERN
IRELAND: ABUSED BY SECURITY FORCES AND PARAMILITARIES (1992); LAWYERS COMMITTEE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE
ABUSE AND INTIMIDATION OF DEFENSE LAWYERS AND THE MURDER OF PATRICK FINUCANE
(1993).
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and disappointing results, even alienating consequences, of
these attempts to control anti-terrorist activities, which have not
been subject to normal standards of scrutiny. This is a sequence
evident both within the United States and the UK as a conse-
quence of September 11 th.
The State's responses to terrorism are invariably "extraordi-
nary" in the way wartime responses are extraordinary, although
the former has a disturbing habit of being transformed from the
category of "abnormal" to "normal" legislation,' 7 or at the very
least affecting subsequent criminal legislation."s For example,
the Black Act 1723, as documented by E. P. Thompson, 9 contin-
ued to shape the lives of English peasants for over a century, as
did the Vagrancy Acts. 211 In more recent times, income tax and
"pay as you earn," both wartime measures, remain principal
methods of tax collection. National identity cards were also in-
troduced as a wartime measure and were not repealed until
1952.21 The Prevention of Violence Act of 1939 was also intro-
duced as a short-term measure as a result of an Irish Republican
Army ("IRA") bombing campaign in Britain, which began and
finished in that year. The legislation remained in force for fif-
16. See Tom Hadden et al., Emergency Law In Northern Ireland: The Context, inJusTICE
UNDER FIRE (Anothony Jennings ed., 1988) (documenting the alienation process in
Northern Ireland); see also, KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTH-
ERN IRELAND (1975); KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE
LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1980); DERMOT WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE
OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1983).
17. Jerry Fitt MP from Belfast commented during the 1981 renewal debate of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act: "It is my impression that once a government has these
powers in their control they are very reluctant to give them up . . . This Act would
certainly come in handy if events took place which did not satisfy the government in
power at the time. The Act is always there, it can always be extended, and it could be
used to deal with such a situation (social unrest arising from unemployment)." Han-
sard, House of Commons, 1981, vol. 1000/1, col. 382.
18. Joe Sim & Philip A Thomas, The Prevention of Terrorism Act: Normalizing the Polit-
ics of Repression, 71J. OF L. AND SOCIETY (1983).
19. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT (1975).
20. William Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 12 Soc. PROBS.
67 (1964).
21. Willcock v. Muckle, 2 KB 367 (1951). This issue reemerged immediately after
September 11th and in the form of a consultation paper from the Home Office on
"entitlement cards." Entitlement Fraud and Indemnification Cards: A Consultation Pa-
per, 2002, Cm. 5557. Immediately after the Birmingham Bombings by the IRA in 1974,
during the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill, there
was a call in Parliament to reintroduce identity cards. P. Smith, Emergency Laws and the
Prevention of Terrorism Acts, in SECURING THE STATE: POLITICS OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN
EUROPE 218 (1982).
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teen years. 22 Jim Marshall MP, commented on this trend to-
wards unexpected legislative longevity during the 1983 renewal
debate of the Prevention of Terrorism [Temporary Provisions]
Act:
Quite apart from the anxiety about the way in which the Act is
applied, there is the added danger that long term acceptance
of its provisions will corrupt our democratic system. I believe
that there is evidence that this has begun to happen. The
power to detain suspects for seven days, which produced a
shock on both sides of the House in 1974, now hardly causes
an eyelid to flutter ... this is an example of an insidious circu-
lar process in which draconian laws soften us up for similar
laws which become the desired standard for further mea-
sures.
2 3
Terrorist threats and actions test the Executive's commit-
ment to the rule of law and good governance. Because of the
extreme powers given by such extraordinary legislation, there is
an incumbent requirement to provide limits to its terms, scope,
and life span. Legal responses of this nature should be restricted
in terms of time to the shortest and most clearly stated period;
should refer to closely defined groups or people in order to limit
the likelihood of innocent people being dragged into the anti-
terrorist legislative net; and, finally, should always remain within
the boundaries of good governance. This Article is based on the
inviolability of these principles and explores the ways in which
various governments have responded.24 In addition, it considers
the importance of the legislative processes, recognizing that the
failure to honor them leaves open the door to executive ex-
ploitation and the misuse of power. It also reflects on the effi-
ciency of anti-terrorist legislation. Does this legislation stop, de-
ter or punish criminals; is it "comfort legislation" directed to-
wards producing and maintaining public confidence; or is it
22. See Chambliss, supra n.20. See aLso Owen Lomas, The Executive and the Anti-Ter-
rotist Legislation of 1939, 16 Puii. L. 16 (1980).
23. Hansard, House of Commons, Mar. 7, 1983, col. 6331983. The annual review
attracted the attendance of fewer and fewer MPs. In 1988, Neil Kinnock, leader of the
Labour opposition, suggested that Labour MPs should abstain in the annual review,
rather than vote against renewal of the Act.
24. "An effective response to terrorism must always be in response to the rule of
law and proportionate to the threat ... A lawless approach risks alienating the popula-
tion, or a section of it, without producing substantial benefit for the counter terrorism
effort." Inquiry into Legislation against Terroiism, 1996, Cm. 3420 at 7.
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counter-productive through the alienation of innocent victims
and ethnic, religious and immigrant groups?
I. THE EXPERIENCE OF HISTORY
The Parliamentary framework of a liberal democracy is
structured to accommodate technical and structured debates oc-
curring between the major political parties represented in the
House. The structure includes the manipulation of timetables,
compilation of amendments, organization of divisions at com-
mittee stage, pairing of parties at voting time, and the role of
"whips" to ensure sufficient votes for the government at crucial
times. National emergencies disturb these traditional arrange-
ments and short-circuit normal procedures. The truncated
processes that are applied retain recognizable form, but the
principles are lost or diminished.
The most striking recent examples of ill-considered emer-
gency legislation are the responses to terrorist activities. 5 There
is a strong and clear parallel between the current legislative
processes in both the United States and the UK. First, by way of
illustration, I examine the Parliamentary passage of the Preven-
25. Britain's colonial history has many examples of the use of emergency powers.
See e.g., Brian Simpson, The Devlin Commission (1959): Colonialism, Emergencies and the
Rule of Law, 22 OXFORDJ. L.S. 17 (2002).
In Nyasaland (Malawi) we found that perhaps under the stress of the emer-
gency, there was at every level of the administration an indifference to and
misuse of the law. By misuse of the law we mean that the Emergency Regula-
tions were treated solely as a source of power to be exploited and added to if
necessary, and not as setting any limits to what the Government could do.
When we enquired what power the Government had to do this or that, it was
often plain that the question had never previously been considered at all: the
Regulations were then searched to see what power there was in the spirit that
if there was not such a power, there ought to be.
Id. at 37 (quoting Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Enquiry (the Devlin Report)
(1959), Cmnd. 814, para. 291). Leo Abse MP during the Parliamentary debate on the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill 1974 stated:
As in every colonial situation repressive legislation is no substitute for policy.
We have no policy whatever... It has been simple for them to turn back to the
1939 (Prevention of Violence Act) legislation, which of course, was intended
... to be in existence for only two years. That legislation lasted for 15 years...
The draftsmen had not only the benefit of that legislation but also the benefit
of legislation which applied under similar circumstances in Kenya, Palestine,
Cyprus and Aden. There are remarkable analogies between that legislation
and clauses in the Bill.
Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 822, cols. 656-58.
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tion of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. 21 It was sub-
ject to a mere seventeen hours of debate in the House of Com-
mons before its "draconian powers" were approved. Parliamen-
tary debate was driven by the public outrage caused by the
Birmingham pub bombings that resulted in the death of twenty-
one people and the injury of a further 180. Brian Walden MP
stated in the House of Commons:
The justification for the Bill to my mind, is overwhelming,
and I make no bones about the fact that I shall not listen with
too much patience to any anxieties about whether this or that
or the other civil right may temporarily be somewhat
abridged... Let us be frank. The overwhelming mood in my
constituency and I believe in my city, is one of vengeance.2 7
The absence of rational discussion and the presence of ven-
geance fuelled by public outrage characterized the mood of
both Parliament and the Nation. Clare Short, currently a Cabi-
net member of the government, attended the debate on the Bill
in her previous capacity as a Home Office civil servant. She whis-
pered to her neighbor, the man who drafted the Bill, that it
would do nothing to prevent terrorism. His reply was "that is not
what it is about. ' 28 Dafydd Elis Thomas MP said at the time that
despite his personal reservations it was more than a person's seat
was worth to vote against the Bill given the extreme level of pub-
lic shock and outrage. 29 Thus, even concerned politicians were
tempted to place their principles on hold during this tense and
extraordinary period.
A similar legislative response was made both in Ireland and
the UK over the Omagh bombings in Northern Ireland in Au-
gust 1998." In Dublin, the Offences Against the State (Amend-
26. The Act was legislatively updated and revised until the Terrorism Act 2000
through the following legislation: Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1976 (Eng.), Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (Eng.), Preven-
tion of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Eng.), Prevention of Terrorism
(Additional Power) Act 1996 (Eng.).
27. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 882, Nov. 28, 1974, cols. 648-50.
28. Francis Wheen, Bills that Cost to Much, GUARDIAN, Sept. 2, 1998. See also C.A.
GEARTY & K.A. KIMBEII, TERRORISM AND THiI Rul-E OF Lxw 17 (1995).
29. Personal communication with the author in 1974.
30. For a detailed account of the Parliamentary passage of this legislation, see
Philip A. Thomas, Emergency Terroist LegislationJ. OF CIv. LIBERTIEs 240 (1998). See also
Cohm Campbell, Two Steps Backwards: The CriminalJustice (Terrofism and Conspiracy) Act
1998, CRIM. L.R. 941 (1999).
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ment) Bill was published on August 31st, debated in the Dail on
September 2nd between 10 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., and thereafter
in the Seanad on the 3rd, followed by an immediate quasi-Presi-
dential signing (this was because the President of Ireland was
overseas).
In Westminster, a similarly complex Bill that quickly became
the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, was
pushed through Parliament in twenty-seven hours. 31 It was pub-
lished and made available to members for reading at 6 p.m. on
the day previous to the House of Commons debate. Tony Benn,
in debate, compared the procedure with that associated with the
former U.S.S.R.: "[w] hat a way to treat Parliament... as though
we were the Supreme Soviet, simply summoned to carry through
the instructions of the Central Committee."32 From across the
Chamber, Richard Shepherd, a Conservative MP, stated: "not in
the face of terrorism or anything should we abandon the liberty
and freedom to discuss these matters." This is no way for the
House to conduct its business. The government is acting
manipulatively. We have been knee-jerked here."3" In the
House of Lords, Sir Patrick Mayhew, former Northern Ireland
Secretary from 1992 to 1997, declared: "We are invited to make
law which may turn out to be dangerous and therefore bad law
for a purpose which will probably not be achieved in practice."34
Thereafter, the Queen proved exceedingly obliging. While on
holiday in Scotland, she gave the Royal Assent to the Act, before
it had completed its Parliamentary passage.
Should the readers be tempted to think that emergencies
and zealous executive action are restricted to world wars and ter-
rorism, they would be wrong. Ireland provides illustration after
illustration of executive detention from early times of its occupa-
tion up to, and including, the present.35 Indeed, it is claimed
31. A personal communication from an MP indicated that his explanation for the
extremely swift passage of the Act revolved around the need to be seen as loyal to Presi-
dent Clinton. He had recently visited Ireland, was identified as an important promoter
of the Good Friday Agreement, and the United States had recently been outraged by
the bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
32. Hansard, House of Commons, Sept. 2, 1998, col. 717.
33. Id. at cols. 714-15.
34. Hansard, House of Lords, Sept. 3 1998, col. 31.
35. For example, The Protection of Life and Property (Ireland) Act 1871 (Eng.);
An Act for the Better Protection of Person and Property in Ireland, 1881 (Eng.). The
history of Northern Ireland, including modern times, is replete with such emergency
2003] 1201
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that Northern Ireland is the testing ground for UK anti-terrorist
legislation.
The architecture of UK emergency and anti-terrorist legisla-
tion in the last quarter of the twentieth century and at the
beginning of the twenty-first century has therefore been de-
fined by a general transposition of measures developed to
deal with Northern Ireland violence to international terror-
ism. Given that these Northern Ireland measures involved
significant erosion of civil liberties and produced sustained
criticism from international human rights agencies, it seems
likely or at least possible that similar problems may emerge
with the application of the new statutes.
II. BALANCING FREEDOM AND SAFETY
Immediately after September 11th, David Blunkett, the
Home Secretary, stated: "We could live in a world which is airy-
fairy, libertarian, where everyone does precisely what they like
and we believe the best of everybody and then they destroy us.""
In the House of Lords, during the second reading of the Antiter-
rorist, Crime and Security Act ("ATCSA"), Lord Roker, Home
Office Minister, stated:
S.. it [the Bill] strikes a balance between respecting our fun-
damental liberties and ensuring that they are not exploited.
The problem is that in a tolerant liberal society, if we are not
guarded we will find that those who do not seek to be part of
our society will use our tolerance and liberalism to destroy
that society. That is a reality. 38
Identical sentiments, albeit expressed more elegantly, were of-
fered earlier by the American judge, Learned Hand, while com-
mentating on the delicate balance applicable in time of warfare.
He wrote: "a society in which men recognize no check upon
their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the pos-
legislation. For example, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland)
1922 (Eng.). For an account of this legislation, see COi.M CAMPBELL, EME RGENCY LAW IN
IRELAND, 1918-1925 (1994).
36. Cohm Campbell & Ita Connolly, A Useful Model?: Emergency and Anti-Terrorist
Powers in Northern. Ireland (forthcoming 2003).
37. For an analysis of this statement, see Paddy Hillyard, In Defense of Civil Liberties,
in BEYOND SEPTEMBER 1 ITH 107 (Phil Scraton ed., 2002).
38. Hansard, House of Lords, Nov. 27, 2001, col. 143.
9/11: USA AND UK
session of only a savage few."'39 Thus, the argument runs, the
pursuit of safety in the war against terrorism carries a price
which is the temporary diminution of freedom. The increased
demand for the assurance of public safety brings with it the nec-
essary and lamented reduction in individual freedom. The inter-
ests of the many trump those of the individual. In turn, the insti-
tutions and principles that support and promote individual free-
dom must also be trimmed during these unusual times.
The true cost of emergency legislation is that the social
unity achieved through the single goal of defeating terrorism re-
sults in the discreditation, loss or suspension of established prin-
ciples that include cherished rules governing the control of
criminal behavior, and also, the protection of the rights of the
individual. The new but united lock-step march of society in its
fight against terrorism results in the suppression of the dissident
voice.'4 Freedom of speech suffers. Critical comment about the
executive is interpreted as being unpatriotic. One is either with
or against the executive: there is no acceptable alternative posi-
tion. The wartime spirit, which eulogizes the term "national se-
curity," produces national unity in a single cause.
In this way, the rule of law is both challenged and damaged
and thereafter its supporting institutions take on a different, un-
healthy form. This change is reflected in the alteration of the
criminal process for crimes involving national security. Such
changes have the disturbing record of creating an undesirable
dual, parallel criminal process structure. Further they can also
leach into and change the original, dominant structures estab-
lished to deal with "ordinary" crime. For example, a closed mili-
tary tribunal replaces the right to a public judicial trial and im-
poses assigned counsel rather than permitting legal counsel of
choice. Rules of criminal evidence and procedure are changed
or waived. These increase the likelihood of a criminal convic-
tion.4" In Northern Ireland, in a series of cases involving the
39. LEARNED HAND, T1-E SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 191 (1952); see also Richard Posner, Se-
curity versus Civil Liberties, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2001; Raymond D. Gastil, What Kind of Democ-
racy?, ATLANTIC, June 1990.
40. Attorney General, John Ashcroft questioned the patriotism of those speaking
out for civil rights: "our tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies." WASH. POST, Dec.
7, 2001.
41. The prosecution's success, however, is not always guaranteed even under such
adverse conditions. For example, consider the case of Clive Ponting, which involved
2003] 1203
1204 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1193
testimony of security forces, witnesses have given evidence anon-
ymously from behind screens.42 Juries have been replaced by
sole judges for scheduled offenses,43 while in the UK, the role
and frequency of jury usage has been reduced particularly in the
cases involving national security through the processes of jury
vetting and jury packing.44 Convicted criminals, having been of-
fered incentives to provide evidence, have appeared as "super-
grass" witnesses for the prosecution; 45 people convicted of no of-
fense are detained without trial through the internment process;
and the police are given extraordinary powers to combat terror-
ist activities.4 ' The judiciary itself is aware of the high stakes
within the trial and the rules they must interpret. In some cases,
the courts have proved reluctant to act in a robust fashion in
order to test the case of the State47 or have been locked into an
issues of national security and official secrets arising out of the Falklands War. R. v.
Ponting, CRIM. L.R. 318 (1985); CLIVE PONTING, TIHE RIGHT TO KNOW ch.6-7 (1985);
Clive Ponting, P v. Ponting, 14J. L. & Soc. 366 (1986).
42. "In the course of sending independent observers to trials and inquests in
Northern Ireland over the past seven years it has been our experience that screening
and anonymity, usually linked to public interest immunity certificates, have been in-
creasingly used to hide the identity of key police and army witnesses. In our view, such
devices do nothing to assist in establishing the facts of the case or in delivering a fair
trial." (Private correspondence with the author 1998). The Saville Tribunal enquiring
into the deaths on Bloody Sunday also provided anonymity to soldiers, available at
www.bloody-SLnday-inquiry.org.uk. See McCann and Others v. UK, (1995) 21 EUR. H.R.
REP. 97 (describing the killing by British security forces of three unarmed members of
the IRA in Gibraltar in 1988); JILL TWEEDIE, THE GIBRALTAR INQUEST REPORT (1988);
J.Tweedie & T.Ward, The Gibraltar Shootings and the Politics ofInquests, 16J. oF L. & Soc.
464 (1989); Ian Jack, Gibraltar, 25 GRANTA 43 (1988); Ruth Costigan & Philip A.
Thomas, Anonymous Witnesses, 51 N.I.L.Q. 326 (2000).
43. As in the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (Eng.). JOHN JACKSON AND SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITH-
oU rJURY: DIPLOCK TTRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTFM (1950); STEVEN GREER & ANTHONY
WHITE, ABOLISHING THE DII'LOCK COURTS: THE CASE FOR RESTORING JURY TRIAL T1O
SCHEDULED OFFENCES IN NORTHERN IREIAND (1986).
44. SEAN ENRIGHT AND JAMES MORTON, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE CRIMINALJURY IN THE
1990s 29-32, 38-42 (1990); R. East, Juty Packing: A Things of the Past?, 48 MODERN L.REv.
518 (1985); Philip A. Thomas, Secret Police on Trial, 98 PLANETI 3 (1993); Andrew Nicol,
Official Secrets and.]ury Vetting, CRIM. L. REV. 284 (1979).
45. STEVEN GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANTI-TERRORIST LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995).
46. There is much literature on these issues, but for a recent and valuable overview
see NOEL WirIry, THERESE MURPHY & STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE, CIVIL LIBERTIES LAw: THE
HUMAN RIGiiS AC1 ERA (2001).
47. See, e.g., DAVID LIi, BETRAYED: THE REAL STORY BEHIND THE MATRIX CHURC-
11ILL CASE (1993) (describing the use of public interest immunity certificates in the
Matrix Churchill case).
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unjust position by the applicable rules.48 There is often, in times
of emergency, a less than rigorous testing of executive actions by
the judiciary, through, for example, the challenging of public
interest immunity certificates.49 Legal formalism remains, but
the forfeit is the spirit of the law.5°
The media adopts a reactionary position when terrorism
threatens and the Executive is given unprecedented and uncriti-
cal media support.5" For example, the editor of New Republic
wrote: "[t]his [N]ation is now at war. In such an environment,
domestic political dissent is immoral with a prior statement of
national solidarity, a choosing of sides. ' 52 Additionally, such ex-
ecutive action in democratic States5" provides an extended li-
cense to repressive regimes that nakedly exploit these moments
of terrorism to further control and suppress minority voices and
those who adopt a critical stance concerning the values and ac-
tions of the State. For example, the Chinese government has
used the events of September l1th to crack down on Uighur re-
sistance to Chinese rule in the province of Xinjiang.54
Not only does terrorism produce widespread distress, anxi-
ety, fear, but as stated, it provokes public responses of unity
through adversity. In addition, the threat of terrorism offers fi-
nancial and growth opportunities to private enterprise, 55 bureau-
48. Official Secrets Act 1911, Sec. 2 (Eng.) (offering, no public interest defense).
See Ponting, supra n.41.
49. Lord Simon wrote in D. v. NSPCC, 1 All E.R. 607 (1977): "If society is disrupted
or overturned by internal or external enemies, the administration ofjustice will itself by
one of the casualties ... as regards national security in its strictest sense, a ministerial
certificate will almost always be regarded as conclusive." Id.
50. Classic examples are found in Germany under National Socialism. See FRANZ
NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW (1935); see also FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUC-
TURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM (1942).
51. EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: How THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETER-
MINE How WE SEE THE REST OF TIE WORLD (1997); E. W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
52. See Lewis Lapham, Notebook: American Jihad, HARPER'S, Jan. 2002.
53. See, for example, the Anti-Terrorist legislation introduced post September
11 th in Australia, Canada, Colombia, European Union, India, Italy, Jordan, New Zea-
land, and South Africa.
54. See FINAN. TIMES,July 27, 2002 (providing a detailed account of these develop-
ments in China). In other countries, such as Egypt, Israel, Philippines, Russia, and
Uzbekistan, U.S. responses have encouraged further repressive executive actions. In
Israel, the Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, described the Palestinian leader, Yassar Arafat,
as "our bin Laden."
55. Vice President, Dick Cheney, is the former CEO of Halliburton Corp. A sub-
sidiary is now involved in a US$16 million project to construct cells at Guantanamo Bay
for new internees from Afghanistan. It is also providing services at Force Provider mili-
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crats,5" and to institution-builders. For example, an ailing airline
industry may receive financial support from the State to keep the
country "flying."57 Security forces may be offered a "new enemy"
when traditional enemies have been defeated or have dimin-
ished in power. 5" The new enemy demands increased, specialist
attention and therefore, a larger budget is required to respond
to the new threat.59 The arms industry is offered an expanded
market and larger profits via an increased defense budget,6 ° and
the investment market responds accordingly.' The defense
budget increases dramatically."2 Thus, terrorism provides op-
tary camp, Afghanistan. The oil lobby is strongly represented in the U.S. executive
branch: former President Bush is linked with the Carlyle Group; C. Rice was formerly
with Chevron; D. Rumsfeld, formerly of Occidental, and President Bush, formerly of
Harken.
56. On September 11 th, Jo Moore, a special adviser in the Department of Trans-
port, wrote an email stating that the terrorist attacks in the United States offered an
opportune moment to release stories that the Department wished to bury.
57. The President produced an emergency package for the airlines: UK£5 billion
in cash and US$10 billion in loan guarantees, though their financial problems existed
prior to September I 1 th. See Steve Tombs, Markets, Regulation and Risk: The US Airlines
Industry and Some Fallout from September I lth, in BEVOND SEPTIEMBER IIu" 157 (Phil
Scraton ed., 2002).
58. The U.S. war on drugs is being scaled down because of cost and the growing
importance of the anti-terrorist program. GUARDIAN, Oct. 21, 2002.
59. The Homeland Security Act of November 2002, establishes a department em-
ploying 170,000 staff with a budget of UK£38 billion. INDIAN EXPRESS, Nov. 21, 2002.
The FBI director has announced "a dramatic departure from the past" by making ter-
rorism prevention the FBI's number one task. Mr. Mueller requested 900 extra agents.
Currently, 3,700, one third of the agency staff, are working on these issues. There will
also be a total restructuring of the FBI. GUARDIAN, May, 30 2002. Previously, President
Clinton, after the Oklahoma bombing in 1994, agreed to hire 1,000 extra FBI agents
and prosecutors to deal with terrorism. In the UK, the Prime Minister blamed tax rises
on the impact of September 11 th. GUARDIAN, May 15, 2001.
60. President Bush avoided a "guns and butter" budget by cutting taxes and cer-
tain social programs, while simultaneously increasing the defense budget, since Septem-
ber 11 th, by US$50 billion. GUARDIANJuly 12, 2002. Boeing is currently working over-
time to produce sufficient equipment for the proposed invasion of Iraq. GUARDIANJuly
29, 2002.
61. Companies that marketed security devices, bomb detection devices, and sur-
veillance and bio-warfare technologies, rocketed up 146 percent after September 11 th
as did a number of defense contractors. Picking War Stocks is Hell, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Dec. 20, 2001.
62. The defense budget for 2003 is the biggest in military spending, in both abso-
lute amount and in percentage terms, since the first years of the Reagan Administra-
tion. It amounts to US$1 billion a day. Senator Kent Conrad, North Dakota, who
chairs the Budget Committee, said: "We're at war and when the president asks for
additional resources for national defense, he generally gets it." See World Socialist Web-
site postings from Feb.6, 2002, available at www.wsws.org.
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portunities for both ailing and aggressive industries and an un-
challengeable expansion program for national security agen-
cies" 3 and the military.64 The Wall Street Journal called on the
President to take full advantage of the "unique political climate"
to "assert his leadership not just on security and foreign policy
but across the board."65 Because these developments occur in
strained times, the normal checks and balances that would be
employed to ensure appropriate use of public finances are sus-
pended or short-circuited."6 Immediacy and results are the or-
der of the day.
Dworkin argues that the claim of the Executive that there is
an essential balance to be drawn between safety and freedom
constitutes a false dichotomy.67 The popular political argument
is that such is the terrorist threat to our security that the levels of
freedom to which we are legally entitled and often experience
must be reduced. Thus, safety trumps freedom in special cir-
cumstances and for a limited time. This should mean that when
the emergency is over, the previous levels of freedom, having
been preserved and protected, should be returned and enjoyed.
However, strengthening safety exposes alleged terrorists to a
higher risk of unjust conviction because traditional procedural
safeguards associated with the rule of law are subject to tempo-
rary suspension. Dworkin challenges the official explanation
that a trade-off suggests that the general population is willing to
accept limitations on its personal freedom.68 In fact, very few
people will be affected by this new relationship. Middle
63. MI5, M16 and GCHQ were given significant budget increases in July 2002, ris-
ing over 7% annually over the next three years: UK£896 million in 2002 to UK£1.18
billion. This rise excludes the cost of new head quarters for the GCHQ estimated at
UK1800 million. GUARDIANJuly 16, 2002.
64. In the UK, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced in his
budget speech that the Ministry of Defense would receive an extra UK £1 billion a year,
which is the highest increase since the end of the Cold War, rising from UK£29.3 billion
to UK£30.2 billion. Brown stated this reflects the need to "meet the urgent moral chal-
lenge of global terrorism." Id.
65. Editorial, WALL STREETJ., Sept. 19, 2001. It encouraged more tax cuts, oil drill-
ing in Alaska, and use of Social Security surpluses.
66. See Gore Vidal, The Enemy Within, OBSERVER, Oct. 27, 2002 (giving an en-
thralling account of "conspiracy theory").
67. The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. oF BooKs, Feb. 28, 2002.
68. "Some of the powers which these Acts give to the police undoubtedly encroach
more upon individual's civil liberties than people would be prepared to tolerate in nor-
mal circumstances. Successive governments and the general public have accepted this in
the past as the necessary price of measures calculated to protect the public from terror-
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America, like middle England, will continue to operate in ways
oblivious and untouched by the new politics introduced by exec-
utive action. The white middle classes remain inviolate,
uninvolved, and oblivious of the reach of anti-terrorist legisla-
tion, its implementation, and enforcement. Those most likely to
be ensnared and possibly victimized by the new and lower stan-
dards of justice are resident aliens, first generation immigrants,
ethnic minorities, especially Arabs and followers of Islam, just as
the general Irish community living in mainland Britain were stig-
matized by their accents and names at the height of the IRA
bombing campaigns." These are the people who will be
targeted through the new procedures for special attention, sur-
veillance, interrogation and possible criminal convictions. It is
not a question of how much liberty will the reader of this Article
sacrifice. The answer is little or none. The appropriate question
is: what does justice require in order to be just?
The idea of trading off freedom for safety on a sliding scale
is a scientific chimera, which, in reality, is misleading. Are mur-
derers offered less protection through law than those who com-
mit social security fraud or embezzlement? The punishment will
differ but similar rules of practice and evidence are applied to
the murderer and the fraudster. Thus, the denial of rights to
some that are available to others represents a slippery slope, par-
ticularly when those to whom rights are denied are themselves
members of a vulnerable group, such as aliens or members of an
ethnic or religious minority. Their risk of false conviction for
terrorist offences is no less than that of the fraudster and indeed,
is greater if their rights are minimized."' The history of terrorist
trials in the UK is significantly marred by major miscarriages of
justice."' Balance should not enter the equation: it is false and
misleading. Instead, it should be understood as an issue of re-
ist attack." Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism, 1996, Cm. 3420, at 9 (emphasis
added).
69. PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITIES (1993)
70. For example, Ali al-Maqtari, a Muslim visitor to the United States, was arrested
on September 15th and jailed for eight weeks. Apparently, he was arrested because his
wife wore an Arab headdress, he spoke a foreign language, French, and because he had
box cutters on him which he used in his job in a market. His testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee is available at http://www.senate.gov/tel20401f-al-
maqtari.htm.
71. The most infamous "terrorist" miscarriages of justice are the Birmingham 6,
the Guildford 4, Maguire 7 and Judith Ward.
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ducing, in the name of national security, the constitutional and
civil rights of possibly vulnerable people and groups who are
identified as alleged terrorists.
A. U.S. Legislative Responses72
Commenting on President Franklin Roosevelt's support for
the wartime internment of Japanese immigrants and Japanese
Americans, Professor Francis Biddle wrote: "[T]he constitution
has not greatly bothered any wartime President. That was a
question of law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must de-
cide. And meanwhile - probably a long meanwhile - we must
get on with the war."7 3 President Bush's declaration of "war"
against terrorism differs in that he used the word "war" rhetori-
cally, not in its legal and constitutional sense, and that he origi-
nally intended the war to be "ongoing" against individuals and
organizations, rather than against a Nation State."4 This com-
mitment was illustrated by the cosmic name he initially gave to
his campaign against international terrorism: "Infinite Justice."
The principal legislative response to September 11th is the
anti-terrorist legislation, entitled, "Uniting and Strengthening of
America to Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001." This creates the powerful
acronym, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. It is a monster piece
of legislation amounting to 342 pages, covering 350 subject ar-
eas, encompassing forty federal agencies, and carrying twenty-
one legal amendments.75
72. It is not intended to provide a detailed analysis of U.S. and UK anti-terrorist
legislation. This is available elsewhere, see e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953 (2002); Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A
Proportionate Response to 11 September, MODERN L.R. 724 (2002); R.M. Talbot, The
Balancing Act: Counter-Terrorism and Civil Liberties in British Anti-Terrorist Law, in LAw
AFTER GROUND ZERO (. Strawson ed. 2002); Andrew Tomkins, Legislating Against
Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, PUB. L. 205 (2002); Casper
Bowden, CCTV For Inside Your Head: Blanket Traffic Data Retention and the Emergency Anti-
Terrorism Legislation, COMPUTER AND TELECOMM. L.R. 21 (2002) 21; Editorial: Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, CRIM. L.R. 159 (2002).
73. FRANcis BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962).
74. Subsequently, President Bush expanded his "war" to include Nations, which,
collectively constitute the "axis of evil," with Iraq being identified as the principal pro-
tagonist.
75. See the following section for a brief account of some of the controversial pow-
ers in the new legislation. However, this Article does not set out to provide a detailed
analysis of U.S. and the UK anti-terrorist legislation. See M. P. O'Connor & C. Rumann,
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House Judiciary Committee Chairman, F. James Sensen-
brenner introduced this legislation on October 2nd. It became
law on October 26th. This record-breaking speed was made pos-
sible only by forcing the pace to the point where serious debate
and discussion were rendered impossible by the executively-re-
stricted time scale and the public demand for political action.
Indeed, even Congressional procedure thus truncated was chal-
lenged by Attorney General John Ashcroft, who stated that it
would be dangerous to delay the Bill's passage for more than a
few days.7 6 Senate Majority leader Tom Daschle said: "all hun-
dred of us could go through this Bill with a fine-tooth comb and
cherry pick and find improvements... We've got ajob to do, the
clock is ticking and the work needs to get done."7 7 In the Sen-
ate, only Russell Feingold voted against the PATRIOT Act, with
sixty-six against it in the House of Representatives. With Con-
gressional staff locked out of their offices due to the anthrax
scare, few members of Congress had time to read the summaries
of the Bill, let alone the fine print of the document that was
passed in such haste. Indeed, what red-blooded American politi-
cian, with an eye on re-election, would vote against such legisla-
tion?78 Bush, whose saber-rattling rhetoric demanded immedi-
ate political support, urged on the representatives. He declared
that "in order to win the war, we must make sure that the law
enforcement men and women have got the tools necessary,
within the Constitution, to defeat the enemy ... We're at war...
a war we're going to win."79 The Act, molded by these warrior
words and passed in furious and frustrated haste, left federal
prosecutors, defenders, regulators and administrators through-
out the country scrambling to decipher what Congress and the
Bush Administration had packed into the legislation. The pub-
Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L:J. 1234
(2003).
76. Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002.
77. Statements from Oct. 12, 2001, available at http://www.CNN.com.
78. Compare supra n.29 and accompanying text. Similar sentiments were expressed
in that public pressure and the continuance as an MP demanded that the politician
refrain from adopting a principled but unpopular position.
79. He further declared that 2002 would also be " . . . a war year. Our war against
terror extends way beyond Afghanistan." GUARDIAN, Dec. 27, 2001. Draft plans trailed
in the media in July 2002 indicate that Iraq is likely to be invaded in January 2003.
OBSERVER, July 6, 2002. Vice President, Dick Cheney, referred to "forty or fifty coun-
tries" that could need military disciplining. John Pilger, The Real Story Behind America's
War, NEw STATESMAN, Dec. 17, 2001.
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lic responded in positive terms. The pre-September approval
rating of Bush was forty-four percent, but that leapt to eighty-six
percent in December 2001.80 In various public polls, roughly
two-thirds said they supported the actions of the Administration.
However, a quarter of those polled stated that President George
Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft did not act in a suffi-
ciently aggressive manner.8' More recently, those who de-
manded a more vigorous response would be pleased to read in
the President's National Security Strategy of the United States
that he contemplates pre-emptive action; the possibility of unilat-
eral action; 2 and also the readiness to respond with the use of
the nuclear option."
1. USA PATRIOT Act
The possible uses and outcomes of this legislation have hor-
rified many constitutional lawyers and civil rights groups. For
example, domestic spying is given a renewed lease of life.
Firewalls were erected after the Watergate scandal and the subse-
quent Senate investigation in 1975 chaired by Senator Frank
Church. Church warned that domestic intelligence gathering
was a "new form of governmental abuse," unconstrained by law,
which had been abused by Nixon and by the FBI which spied on
over half a million Americans during and after the McCarthy
era. One reform was the separation within the FBI of criminal
investigation and intelligence gathering against foreign spies
and international terrorists. The Act foreshadows the end of
that separation by making key changes to the underpinning law,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") 1978. FISA
demanded that wiretaps and searches for intelligence purposes,
as opposed to evidence, be undertaken only if the "primary pur-
80. Approval ratings were published in the WASH. POST on Dec. 21, 2001 and N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2002.
81. Public Agenda Special Edition: Terrorism, available at http//www.publicagenda.
org/specials/terrorism/terror pubopinion.htm. Those who wished for a more vigor-
ous interrogation should note that the CIA has used "stress and duress" techniques on
A1-Qaeda suspects held at secret overseas detention centers. They have also contracted
out their interrogation to foreign intelligence agencies known to routinely use torture.
Cofer Black, former director of the CIA counter-intelligence branch, told a congres-
sional intelligence committee: "All you need to know: there was a before 9/11, and
there was an after 9/11 ... After 9/11 the gloves came off." WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002.
See aiso GUARDIAN, Jan. 25, 2003.
82. GUARDIAN, Sept. 21, 2002.
83. GUARDIAN, Dec. 12, 2002.
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pose" was to listen to a specific foreign spy or terrorist. The new
Act lowers the level to a "significant purpose." Roving wiretaps
throughout the United States now operate on a single warrant.
Americans engaged in civil disobedience or other forms of civil
protest might be charged with "domestic terrorism" if violence
occurs. Senator Patrick Leahy, the Senate negotiator on the Bill,
said on the day it was passed: "The Bill enters new and un-
charted territory by breaking down traditional barriers between
law enforcement and foreign intelligence."84 Morton Halperin,
a defense expert, stated that if a government intelligence agency
"thinks you're under the control of a foreign government, they
can wiretap you and never tell you, search your house and never
tell you, break into your home, copy your hard drive, and never
tell you they have done it.""5 Some of the surveillance provisions
expire, or "sunset," after a period of four years, unless renewed.
The UK's experiences of the "temporary" nature of its anti-ter-
rorist legislation suggest that it is unlikely that the "sun" will set
on this Act.
For a modern Nation created largely by immigrants, the
new U.S. laws covering non-citizens are ironically harsh. Section
412 of the Act permits indefinite detention of immigrants and
other non-citizens. It requires that immigrants "certified" by the
Attorney General be charged within seven days with a criminal
offence or an immigration violation, which need not be on the
grounds of terrorism. Those detained for non-terrorist offences
face the possibility of life imprisonment if their country of origin
refuses to accept them. Detention would be allowed on the At-
torney General's finding of "reasonable grounds to believe" in
the detainee's involvement in terrorism or an activity that poses
a danger to national security, or the safety of the community or
any person. A review of the detention takes place at six-month
intervals, but what is striking is the absence of a trial in open
court to test the State's case for prosecution.
During the Second World War, President Roosevelt author-
ized the incarceration of more than 110,000 people of Japanese
origin, 70,000 of whom were American citizens of Japanese de-
84. Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on the Anti-Terrorism Bill, Oct. 25, 2001,
available at http://leahy.senate.gov.
85. J. Van Bergen, Repeal the USA Patriot Act, TRUT- OUT, Apr. 4, 2002.
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scent,8' 11,000 of German origin, and 3,000 of Italian origin.
President Bush is replicating this process, justified through the
rhetoric of undeclared war. Should it be thought that these new
detention powers are merely precautionary and unlikely to be
utilized, the actions of Attorney General Ashcroft constitute a
sobering reality. He began by authorizing the detention of 1,200
non-citizens. Some were held for months, and as of July 2002,
there were still seventy-four people held on charges of immigra-
tion violations, while 131 Pakistanis were deported to Pakistan in
June 2002 aboard a privately chartered Portuguese plane amidst
great secrecy. Some of those who were deported had lived in the
United States for many years and left their families and their
jobs. None of the deportees were said to have links with terror-
ism. 7
It is lawful under Section 412 to detain people indefinitely.
Legal advice is available, but solely funded by the detainee. The
government stopped updating the tally of those detained, so that
firm figures became unavailable. After refusing to make any in-
formation public about the detainees, including their names, lo-
cation of detention, or nature of the charges, Ashcroft finally
announced on November 27, 2001, that 548 detainees were be-
ing held on immigration charges and that federal criminal
charges had been filed against 104 of them. TheJustice Depart-
ment also announced a plan for investigators to interview 5,000
people: Middle Eastern males between the ages of eighteen and
thirty-three, who had arrived in the United States after January,
2000. In response to a claim that this is a racially based round-
up, Ashcroft declared that "we are being as kind and as fair and
as gentle as we can.""8 Of particular concern was the CNN poll
that revealed that forty-five percent of those polled would not
object to the use of torture if it provided information about ter-
rorism. There was also media discussion about the possible need
86. See MARTIN GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVALU-
ATION (1949). See also Eric Yamamoto, Reluctant Redress: The U.S. Kidnapping and Intern-
ment of Japanese Latin Americans, in RELUCTANT REDRESS 132 (Martha Minow ed., 2002);
see also PAUL AVRICH, ANARCHIST VOICES (1995) (describing, the Palmer Raids in 1920
when approximately 6,000 alleged communists were rounded up).
87. GUARDIAN, July 11, 2002.
88. In August 2002, a federal judge ruled that the Bush administration had no
right to conceal the identities of hundreds of people detained after September l1th
and ordered that most of their names be released within fifteen days. Neil Lewis, The
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002.
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for the use of "truth serums" or sending suspects to countries
where harsher interrogation measures were common.89 It is im-
portant to remember that the "disappeared" and tortured peo-
ple of South American countries in the 1970s and 1980s were
killed and tortured by military personnel trained by the CIA.9o It
was also announced that the U.S. government is considering
plans to send elite military units on overseas missions to assassi-
nate al-Qaeda leaders, without informing the foreign govern-
ments. Dick Cheney, the vice-president, was asked whether such
action is lawful. He replied that he thought it was legal but "he
would have to check with the lawyers on that."9' On November
3, 2002, six alleged, A1-Qaeda terrorists were killed in Yemen by a
CIA drone plane that carried a missile called "the Predator."
The final illustration of the new wave of executive action is
the Military Order signed by the President on November 13,
2001, which allows non-U.S. citizens suspected of involvement in
"international terrorism" to be tried by special military commis-
sions. The term "alien" included combatants captured in Af-
ghanistan and also aliens already resident in the United States.
These commissions are not subject to the regular rules and safe-
guards that cover a military court martial. The President
claimed that it was "not practicable" to try terrorists under "the
principles of law and the rules of evidence" applicable in U.S.
domestic criminal courts. These commissions were empowered
to act in secret, to pass the death penalty by a two-thirds majority,
and their decisions cannot be appealed to other courts. Subse-
quently, after considerable pressure, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. De-
fense Secretary, refined the rules created by the Executive Order
by giving suspected terrorists the following rights: presumption
of innocence; choice of counsel; to see the prosecution's evi-
dence; a public trial; and to remain silent with no adverse infer-
ence being drawn. However, in such trials no jury will be intro-
89. SeeJohnathan Alter, Time to Think About Thrture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5 2001 (say-
ing: "We'll have to think about transferring some suspects to our less squeamish allies
even if that's hypocritical. Nobody said this was going to be pretty.").
90. The CIA had plans to murder Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba of the
Congo.
91. The Hellfire missile hit its target at 950 mph and was controlled by a U.S. team
in Djibouti, 150 miles away. GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2002. It is reported that the Yemen
government was not informed of the impending attack. GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Nov. 13,
2002. It was Israel that pioneered the use of this missile for summary executions.
GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 2002.
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duced; hearsay will be accepted in evidence; and there will be no
civilian review on appeal.92
The U.S. base in Cuba, Guantanamo Bay, was identified by
General Tommy Franks, head of Central Command, as suitable
to hold Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists. Cuba was preferred
ahead of Guam, a Pacific island. Subject to modification, the
Cuban base can detain as many as 2,000 prisoners. On January
12, 2002, Camp Delta received its first unlawful combatants and
placed them in chain link cages. Ninety men manacled,
hooded, with shaved beards, and some sedated, were flown in
from Afghanistan. Subsequently, press photographs depicted
them as hooded, shackled, and kneeling in front of U.S. soldiers.
By October 2002, the figure had risen to six hundred and twenty
prisoners. It was expected to house a further two hundred by
Christmas 2002.9' The base is to be included in a "twenty year
plan" for Guantanamo's naval base.
The men are detained in wire "cages," measuring eight feet
by six feet eight inches. They are exposed to the elements. The
conditions are described by Amnesty International as "falling be-
low the minimum standards for humane behavior." This is per-
haps unsurprising given that Donald Rumsfeld described the
men as "the hardest of the hard-core," adding: "I do not feel the
slightest concern over their treatment."'94 He described the base
as "the least worst place."95 President Bush described all of them
as "killers" prior to any tribunal hearings, and that they would
not be granted the status of prisoners of war.96 Bush stated that
92. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002.
93. GUARDIAN,July 26, 2002 and Oct. 29, 2002; OBSERVER, Nov. 3, 2002. There are
seven British nationals held there.
94. GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2002. Brigadier-General, Rick Baccus, the camp com-
mander at Guantanamo Bay, was relieved of his duties in October 2002 after a newspa-
per report quoted a defense source as saying that he was "too nice" to the inmates.
GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2002. Arc lights provide a 24-hour lighting system. One detainee is
fifteen years of age; some are in their seventies. Each man spends thirty minutes a week
showering and exercising. The remainder of the time is spent alone in a "cell." Trips
to the clinic involve men being shackled to the trolley and then chained to the clinic
bed. The men are exercised in shackles on their ankles, waist, and hands. Psychologi-
cal techniques, including sleep deprivation, are used as part of the interrogation pro-
cess. There have been four serious attempts at suicide. Thirty other men have tried to
injure themselves. OBSERVER, Nov. 4, 2002.
95. MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2002.
96. Ronald Dworkin, N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002. Pakistani anti-terrorist
experts are quoted as believing that fifty-five of the fifty-eight Pakistani militants held in
Cuba have no ties to A-Qaeda. NEW STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002. Almost 10% of the
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"non-U.S. citizens who plan and/or commit mass murder are
more than criminal suspects. They are unlawful combatants who
seek to destroy our country and our way of life." '97 The term
"unlawful combatant" is used because the U.S. government has
not defined the Taliban as prisoners of war, thereby denying
them their rights under the 1949 Geneva Convention; nor have
they been defined as criminals, thereby denying them their
rights under the U.S. Constitution. 8
Organizing a defense from within this camp will prove ex-
tremely difficult, assuming that it is the intention to try the men
in front of military commissions. The alternative is that the men
are interrogated and detained at the pleasure of the President.
Indeed, on March 28, 2002, Rumsfeld suggested that detainees
who had not been tried, or those who had been tried and acquit-
ted, might nevertheless be kept in detention "for the duration of
the conflict." Asked how he would define the end of the con-
flict, he said it would be "when we feel that there are no effective
global terrorist networks functioning in the world that these peo-
ple would be likely to go back to and begin again their terrorist
activities."99 Pierre-Richard Prosper, ambassador-at-large for war
crimes issues, reinforced this position when he stated that "the
judicial process may have to wait until after the war on terror is
w on." io
B. United Kingdom
The ink was hardly dry on the Terrorism Act 2000'1 l that
came into force in February 2001, before a fresh commitment to
yet stronger anti-terrorist legislation was issued by the Labour
government. Again, the brevity of its passage is exceeded only by
prisoners have no meaningful connection with al-Qaeda or the Taliban and have been
held for more than a year because of bureaucratic wrangling and obstinacy. Los ANGE-
LES TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002.
97. WASH. PosT, Nov. 30, 2001. See aLo Laurance Tribe, Trial By Fuy, NEW RHPU-
UC, Dec. 10, 2001.
98. M. Allen & S. Schmidt, Bush Defrnds Secret TribunaLsfor Terrorism, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 2001.
99. Anthony Dworkin, Tial Detention or Release, in CRIMES OF WAR, May 17, 2002,
available at http://www.Crimesofwar.o,-g.
100. Guantanamo Britons still a threat, says U.S., GUARDIAN, Sept. 21 2002. "Criminal
proceedings generally occur after the end of hostilities. We will make it clear at that
time whether these people are to be fed into the judicial process or whether they will be
released." Id.
101. Terrorism Act 2000 ch.l1 (Eng.).
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the extent of the powers it provides.1 2 The government allowed
sixteen hours for the Commons debate. The Terrorism Act ex-
tended the powers of the police to investigate, arrest, and detain.
It created new offences allowing courts to deal with terrorist ac-
tivities, which occurred outside national borders. The moral
panic that consumed the United States was reflected in its most
constant ally, the UK.
David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, introduced the gov-
ernment's Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill into the Com-
mons on November 12th. It was a big Bill, containing 118 pages,
125 clauses, and eight Schedules. After a concentrated House of
Lords savaging, it became law on December 15th. The Home
Secretary said: "strengthening our democracy and reinforcing
our values is as important as the passage of new laws . . . the
legislative measures which I have outlined will protect and en-
hance our rights, not diminish them . .. ",I While claiming that
the powers were measured, reasonable, and necessary, on the
day of the Bill's Parliamentary presentation Blunkett laid a
Human Rights Derogation Order. The UK thereby derogated
from the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") Ar-
ticle 5, which guarantees the right to liberty and prohibits deten-
tion without trial. The UK is the only signatory to the ECHR to
feel it necessary to derogate as a result of this particular terrorist
threat. The derogation occurred despite the statement by the
Home Secretary that "there is no immediate intelligence point-
ing to a specific threat to the United Kingdom."" °4
The speed of the Bill's passage through the House of Com-
mons, a total of sixteen hours, is reminiscent of previous emer-
gency legislation.'0 5 The Bill was given its Second Reading on
November 19th. A timetable motion was passed, which provided
that the Committee Stage and the Third Reading should be
102. "The result of the passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
is once again a legislative morass . . . There was no time for considered or sustained
review." CLIVE WALKER, THE ANTI-TERRORIST IEGISLArION 7 (2002).
103. PARL. DEB., H.C.(2001), col. 925. Similar descriptions can be seen attached to
previous anti-terrorist legislation. For example, Jack Straw, when introducing the Ter-
rorism Act 2000 stated that it was "simply protecting democracy." GUARDIAN, Nov. 14,
1999.
104. Hansard, House of Commons, Nov. 15 2001, col. 925. See Lawless v. Ireland, 1
EUR. H.R. REP. 1 (1960).
105. The Prevention of Terrorism [Temporary Provisions] Act 1984 (Eng.) took
the House of Commons seventeen hours.
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completed in a further two days. The Derogation Order was de-
bated for ninety minutes. The Committee Stage of the full
House occurred on November 21st and November 26th. It fin-
ished at 11:57 p.m. and was immediately followed by the Third
Reading that was concluded at midnight. The Home Secretary
spoke for three minutes and Oliver Letwin, the Shadow Home
Secretary, responded by saying: "I shall be brief.. ." Indeed, he
was - he was interrupted mid-sentence by the vote that went
323 to 79. Royal Assent to the Act was granted on December
14th.l16
While the passage of the Bill through the democratically
elected House of Commons traveled at the same whirlwind
speed as that of the PATRIOT Act through Congress, the House
of Lords refused to participate in the legislative stampede. Para-
doxically, it fell to the unelected House of Lords to offer a de-
gree of meaningful reflection and opposition to the Bill. Thus,
it was the liberal Lords who held the line for the democratic
demand to honor civil liberties. Lord Corbett of Castle Vale
said: "after the outrage of September l1th, the way to defend
democracy is not to dismantle it; it is to strengthen it. Otherwise
... the Mother of Parliaments is being asked to put its name to
achieving some of the aims of those who carried out the events
of September 11th." '' 1 7 The Lords made seventy amendments
and although most were reversed in the Commons, several were
maintained and constituted significant defeats for the govern-
ment. It was the issue of indefinite detention without charge
that raised major opposition. A person reasonably suspected of
being an international terrorist could be detained indefinitely
and without charge. It was, the Home Secretary claimed, to
cover "dozens of foreign" people who could not be prosecuted
for insufficiency or inadmissibility of evidence and who could
not be deported if they faced either torture or death overseas.
The detainee's appeal against detention is through the Spe-
106. The Joint Committee on Human Rights stated that "many important ele-
ments of the Bill were not considered at all in the House of Commons ... We share the
view of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution that the inclusion of
many non-emergency measures was inappropriate in emergency legislation which was
required to be considered at such speed." SeeJoint Committee oil Human Rights, Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Further Report, House of Lords, Official Report, vol.
51, 2001-02, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 420, 2001-02, at para. 2.
107. House of Lords, Official Report, Dec. 6 2001, col. 1005.
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cial Immigration Appeal Commission ("SIAC") that will sit in se-
cret. A security-cleared special advocate appointed by the Com-
mission will represent the detainee. The special advocate cannot
take client's instructions without express permission of the Com-
mission. Evidence may be adduced without showing it to the de-
tainee or special advocate. Although an appeal on a point of law
could go to the Court of Appeal, there was no appeal against the
Home Secretary's certificate of detention. The government
amended the Bill, in the light of the Lord's opposition, by rais-
ing the status of SIAC to that of a superior court of record,
thereby ensuring that its decision was not subject to judicial re-
view!
In December andJanuary 2002, several arrests were made in
London and Leicester. Detainees, who have not been charged,
are in the London high security prison, Belmarsh. They were
locked up for twenty hours a day and did not see daylight. Upon
detention, they were not given access to lawyers or to their fami-
lies. They could not speak to families without the presence of an
approved translator who visited once a week. They were denied
prayer facilities apart from fifteen minutes on Friday, but in the
absence of an imam. Gareth Pierce, a solicitor who represents
several of them, stated that "these men have been buried alive in
concrete coffins and have been told the legislation provides for
their detention for life without trial."""18 In July, the appeal of
nine of the interned foreigners was allowed by SIAC and two
others left the country voluntarily. Neither was arrested in the
receiving country." 9 The Home Secretary appealed against the
decision of SIAC. On October 25th, the Court of Appeal lead by
the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, overturned SIAC and held
that those men who are subject to indefinite detention without
charge are detained lawfully and this detention does not contra-
vene the ECHR." t
Wide-scale trawling, retention, and availability of data were
other highly charged concerns. Currently, there are over fifty
108. UK Terror Detentions 'Barbaric,' GUARDIAN, Jan. 20, 2002.
109. SeeJohn Wadham & Shami Chakrabarti, Indefinite Detention without Trial, NEW
L.J. 1564 (2001).
110. A, X and Y and Ors v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, EWCA Civ. 1502
(2002). See also GUARDIAN, Oct. 26, 2002. Once again, the evidence put forward by the
government to back its argument remained secret on the grounds of national security.
The Court of Appeal did not consider this "closed" evidence.
2003] 1219
1220 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALIAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1193
statutes that allow a number of public authorities to disclose in-
formation in the light of criminal proceedings. Oliver Letwin
complained:
[T] he Home Secretary is saying that to catch terrorists, he has
to allow eighty-one government agencies, from the BBC to
the NHS, to reveal somebody's records, even if they are being
investigated for a traffic offence in the United States. I find
that a difficult chain of logic to follow."'
The Bill sought to extend "criminal proceedings" to include
general "investigations," both within the UK and abroad. The
Lords attempted to limit this power and succeeded in so far as
the government finally agreed that the Act would carry an ex-
press requirement that any such disclosure would be limited by
the Human Rights Act. This requires that disclosure be propor-
tionate to what was sought to be achieved by the disclosure. The
human rights lawyer, Lord Lester, described this amendment as
mere "window dressing."
Serious disagreements also arose over the retention of data.
The proposal to adopt criminal justice measures under Title Vi
of the Treaty on European Union (known as the Third Pillar),
including the proposed European arrest warrant, resulted in a
defeat for the government. The government agreed that such
changes would be introduced through primary legislation and
via the backdoor through negative resolution procedure. Never-
theless, the new anti-terrorism measures developed by the Justice
and Home Affairs Council ('JHAC") and the European Council
after September 1 1th, will be introduced through powers in the
Act.' 12
The Bill was also attacked for carrying irrelevant legislative
baggage, some of which is controversial. These were not issues
requiring immediate attention and it was felt that the Home Of-
fice had enjoyed the opportunity to clear its shelves by adding
entitlement cards,' as well as matters of religious hatred,' po-
IlI. On The Record, BBC, Dec. 9, 2001.
112. See Thomas Mathiesen, Expanding the Concept of Terrorism, in BEYOND SEPTEM-
BER lTH: AN ANTiHOOGY OF DISSENT (Phil Scraton ed., 2002).
113. In May 1993, Earl Ferrers stated in the House of Lords that he could not
think of a single terrorist offence that would have been avoided had terrorists been
obliged to carry identity cards, and that the government was reviewing "every conceiva-
ble method of trying to prevent terrorism but ID cards do not feature high on the list."
H.L. DEns. May 18, 1993 cols. 1555-56. Lord Lloyd also rejected ID cards as a useful
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lice powers, asylum, immigration, corruption, and bribery. D.
Hogg stated that "most of the Bill has simply come out of the
Home Office back lobby. It has a lot of stuff that it wants to put
before Parliament and it has attached it to this Bill."' "15
Finally, the Lords successfully introduced expanded sunset
clauses and reviews into the Bill. Thus, the provisions for deten-
tion without charge will lapse after five years, unless renewed by
primary legislation. In the meantime, the provisions will be re-
viewed after fifteen months and thereafter, annually. The entire
Act is to be reviewed by a body of Privy Councilors within two
years of Royal Assent. However, the Home Secretary announced
that the review body will have no access to the detailed cases that
have gone through SIAC, nor to the evidence that was presented
in private.
The Bill is a classic example of legislation drafted too
quickly, too loosely, and thereafter passed too hastily.' 16 Never-
theless, concerns voiced by judges and legal experts over the
scope and likely efficiency of the Act did little to cool the govern-
ment's ardor. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, took the un-
usual step of expressing concern about the passage of the Act,
writing: "In previous wars, things have happened which, with
hindsight, are now known to have been wrong. We have to be
astute to avoid that happening, so far as possible."' 1 7 Michael
Zander noted that "this was complex and controversial legisla-
tion rushed through Parliament at breakneck speed. We are un-
likely to know whether it contributes to making this country a
safer place."' 8 Zander questioned the efficacy of the legislation,
tool in the fight against terrorism. Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism, 1996,
Cm. 3420, at para. 16.31. See generally Philip A. Thomas, Identity Cards, 58 MODERN L.R.
702 (1995); Philip A. Thomas, Identity Cards and Fraudsters, in BONFIRE OF THE LIBERTIES
(Phil Scraton ed., 2003) (forthcoming).
114. M.M. Idris, Religion and the Anti-Terrorist, Crime and Security Act 2001, CRIM. L.R.
890 (2002).
115. Hansard, House of Commons, Nov. 19, 2001, col.94.
116. 0. Letwin MP: "I want to say a word about process. I have discerned across
the House, as everyone here must have done, a strong feeling that a few days - three
days, in the case of this House, are not enough fully to scrutinize the Bill." Hansard,
House of Lords, Nov. 19, 2001, col. 39. Lord Dixon-Smith: "The Bill has achieved
three day's discussion, pretty nearly on the trot, in another place. That is not sufficient
time to consider a measure of this significance." Hansard, House of Lords, Nov. 13,
2001, col. 155.
117. DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 17, 2001.
118. The Anti Terrorism Bill: What Happened?, NEW L. J. 1880 (2001). However,
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but considered that there is a lack of evidence that would allow
us to make an informed judgment. However, some evidence
does exist and this Article moves to consider this point.
III. DOES ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION WORK?
There are strong reasons and powerful interests promoting
the expansion and continuation of legislation reputed to defeat
terrorism. While the widely promoted arguments of "warfare"
and "balance" do not justify the powers found within the most
recent legislation, nevertheless, history shows that civil rights
consistently come out second best when terrorism dominates the
political agenda." 9 Terms such as "national security" and "pub-
lic safety" trump the vocabulary of civil rights. Courts display re-
luctance in challenging the State's decision in such cases; 120 the
media becomes an uncritical supporter of executive action;'12 1
and the general public are encouraged to see the terrorist as
demonic, unstable, and a random threat to each and everyone.
Given that civil rights arguments are relatively unsuccessful
within the context of the response to terrorism, a more fruitful
argument might be via a functional, rational account, based
upon the review of results.'2 Does this legislation work and if so
for whom? A set of practical questions, which seek to isolate is-
sues, classify responses, and "de-terrorize" the political atmos-
phere, may help in promoting a rational account of the effi-
ciency and effects of this corpus of law. There is a range of ques-
tions, which could be addressed, such as: how many people have
been successfully prosecuted under anti-terrorist legislation;
does it have deterrent value; 23 do politicians really believe in the
Lord McIntosh of Haringay, did feel that the Bill would be of some value when he
claimed that it "would be a significant help in combating television." Hansard, House of
Lords, Nov. 28 2001, col. 417 (emphasis added).
119. See EDWARD PALMER TiiOMi'SON, WRITING BY CANDLELIGHT (1985) (arguing
that the greatest thief of civil liberties is the State).
120. See e.g., Liversidge v. Anderson, [1941] 2 All E.R. 612.
121. NOAM CiOMSKY, THE IRREPRESSIBLE CHOMSKY (2001). See also GUARDIAN
WEEKLY, Nov. 13, 2002 (stating the Russian State Duma voted in November 2002 to
impose broad limitations on media coverage of terrorism).
122. "However, there is also abundant evidence to show that such responses [re-
pressive overreaction to terrorism] play into the hands of terrorists and, if prolonged,
become totally counter-productive." Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism, 1996,
Cm. 3420 at 2, 59.
123. For example, Faith Mitchell of the National Research Council, National Acad-
emy of Science, United States, is reported as saying:
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legislation; what unintended harm has occurred; and how is ter-
rorism defined?
The Prevention of Terrorism [Temporary Provisions] Act
1974 ("PTA") was described by the then Home Secretary, Roy
Jenkins, as a "draconian measure."'124 During the debate on the
ATCSA, RoyJenkins, later Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, returned to
the original Bill and stated:
I think that it helped to steady a febrile State of opinion at the
time and to provide some limited additional protection.
However, I doubt it frustrated any determined terrorist... If
I had been told at that time that the Act could still be on the
statute book twenty years later, I would have been horrified.
.. It is not one of the legislative measures of which I can be
most proud. 12
5
The ATCSA re-introduces a discredited power to "intern."
Part 4 of the legislation allows for the indefinite detention with-
out charge of certain foreign nationals suspected of terrorism,
based on executive decision. This differs from the Northern Ire-
land internment power in scale, but not in principle. Intern-
ment was introduced by the Northern Ireland Stormont govern-
ment in 1971 when twenty-seven people were killed in the first
eight months of that year. Further, it was felt that the normal
judicial processes were proving incapable of dealing with the ris-
ing numbers of witnesses, juries, and magistrates who were being
intimidated by terrorists. However, the intelligence on which
the internments were made was gravely deficient and many of
those who were swept up had little or nothing to do with terror-
ism. This decision proved to be a powerful recruiting sergeant
for the Provisional IRA. In the following four months, after
bringing in that power, 147 people were killed and 1972 saw 467
during the Cold War, at least in retrospect, it was simpler. You threatened to
bomb the Soviet Union to death and they didn't want that and that effectively
deterred them from bombing us. This approach would not work with groups
such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. It is more complicated than
that because the adversaries are more elusive.
Statement, available at http://www.nap.edu; see also N. SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002.
The President's National Security Strategy for the United States, published in Septem-
ber 2002, states: "Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist
enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents."
124. House of Commons, Official Report, Nov. 25, 1974, col. 35.
125. Hansard, House of Lords, Nov. 27, 2001, col. 199. He also held this view in
1991. SeeJENKINS, supra n.13. LordJenkins died inJanuary 2003.
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deaths as a result of terrorist action, which is the highest annual
total. It has been suggested that the over-reaction of the State
fuelled a violent response.' 2" Support for the IRA in the United
States increased and the internment camps became a kind of
"staff college" for terrorists.12 7
Lord Lloyd of Berwick stated in his review of anti-terrorist
legislation that "there is, in my view, no need for such a power in
any body of permanent counter terrorism legislation." 28 During
the Parliament debate on the Northern Ireland (Emergency Pro-
visions) Bill 1998, Frank Dubs stated: "In this Bill, the decision
has been taken to get rid of the power of internment. Frankly it
has not worked ... we believe that the use of internment would
strengthen the terrorists."'12 More recently, in the House of
Commons debate on the ATCSA, Douglas Hogg declared that
"the general arguments against internment without trial are very
powerful. We normally get the wrong people; it is unjust; we
depart from the moral high ground and we alienate folk. It is a
jolly bad policy to pursue.'" As is noted, the exercise of the
"internment" power in the ATCSA was successfully challenged in
the SIAC, although not on the grounds of "over-reaction."' 3'1
Defining "terrorism" is difficult.'32 Definitions of "good"
and "evil" are also confusing.'33 For example, Werner von
126. NOEL Wi-irn', THIERESE MURP'Y& STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE, CIVL LIBERTIES LxW:
THE HUMAN Ric;Tirs Actr ERA, 122 (2001).
127. It is not difficult to conclude that those interned in Guantanamo Bay will also
emerge changed, hardened, determined, and better informed in the ways of violence.
128. Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism, 1996 Cm. 3420, at 100.
129. See Hansard, House of Commons, Jan. 12, 1998, col. 909. Section 3 repealed
the power of internment. But see Chahal v. UK, 23 EUR. H.R. REP. 413 (1997).
130. Hansard, House of Commons, Nov. 19, 2001, col. 95.
131. See GUARDIAN, supra n.83.
132. One study considered 109 definitions and concluded that "the search for an
adeqjuate definition is still on." ALEX SCiMimn & ALiIERTJONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM:
A NEW GUIDE TIO AcrIORS, AUTHORS, CONCEI'rs, DATA BASES, TvFORIES AND LITERATURE
(1988). "The latest British legislation seems to draw the definition so wide as to be
somewhat meaningless." Meltzer, supra n.71; see also State Watch, Analysis Report No. 4,
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news (accounting of EU attempts to define "ter-
rorism"); Philip A. Thomas & T. Standley, Re-Defining Tenrrism, 4 AUSTRAL. J. OF L. &
Soc. 61 (1987). Noam Chomsky does not agree that defining terrorism is hard. He
keeps to the official U.S. Code and Army Manuals. "They give definitions that are good
enough for practical purposes." Personal correspondence (Oct. 24, 2002) (on file with
the author).
133. The classic and much-quoted illustration is Nelson Mandela: convicted ter-
rorist and prisoner on Robbin Island, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1994, and President
of South Africa thereafter.
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Braun was considered by western States to be "evil" for inventing
the V2 bombers that were used against London, but became
"good" when he used his knowledge on behalf of the Americans.
Saddam Hussein was described by the United States as "good"
when fighting Iran, but was subsequently redefined as "evil."
Osama bin Laden was also "good" when, supported by the CIA,
he acted as a freedom fighter against communism in Afghani-
stan. The Taliban were also supported as friends when the U.S.
strategy towards the country changed after Afghanistan was iden-
tified as a possible pipeline route for the oil due to come from
Central Asian States.'13 4 Perhaps the terrorist can be defined as
homo sacer.' 5 In ancient Roman law, this person could be killed
with impunity and his death had no sacrificial value, as he was
already considered to be in the realm of the gods. Thus, the
terrorist becomes a non-person: game to be hunted and de-
stroyed. 136
Employing the clich6 of "one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter" is inappropriate and unhelpful for law-
yers. An established principle of statutory interpretation is that
legislation seeking to expand law beyond accepted provisions
should be interpreted literally and strictly, as in criminal and tax
laws. 137 Expansive definitions of extraordinary laws that stretch
the rule of law are contrary to judicial rules of interpretation.
Nevertheless, the statutory definition of "terrorism," as laid out
in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1989,138 has been increased dramatically by the Terrorism Act
2000,"9 and this has been consolidated in the ATCSA. 14 ' The
134. See generally AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: THE STORY OF THE AFGHAN WARLORDS
(2001) (considering especially the chapter "Romancing the Taliban: The Battle for Pipe-
lines"); see also MICHEAL PARENTI, THE TERRORISM TRAP (2002) (considering especially,
the chapter on "The Holy Crusade for Oil and Ga.'); PETER BERGEN, AL QAEDA HOLY WAR
INC (2002); NAFEEZ AHMED, THE WAR ON FREEOOM (2002). "The Clinton administration
has taken the view that a Taliban victory would act as counterweight to Iran . . . and
would offer the possibility of new trade routes that could weaken Russian and Iranian
influence in the region." N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1997. See generally ZBIGNIEw BRZEZINSKI,
THE GRAND CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES (1997) (lay-
ing out regional U.S. foreign policy).
135. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998).
136. See Slavoj Zizek, Are We in a War?, 3 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, May 23, 2002.
137. DPP v. Ottewell, (1970] AC 642, Farrell v. Alexander, 3 WLR 642 (1975),
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Ross & Coulter, I All ER 616 (1948).
138. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Sec. 20 (1) (Eng.).
139. Id. at Sec. 1.
140. Id. at Sec. 21.
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Terrorism Act 2000 moved away from the Northern Ireland fo-
cus and included "religious fundamentalists" and "individuals
with fanatical leanings."' 4 ' The expanded definition is found in
Section 1 (1):
[T]he use of threat, for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious or ideological cause of action which: (a) involves
serious violence against any person or property; (b) endan-
gers the life of any person; or (c) creates a serious risk to the
health or safety of the public or a section of the public.
This Act makes terrorist legislation permanent, thereby recog-
nizing the continuing existence of a terrorist threat to our soci-
ety. The result is: there now exists emergency legislation against
a permanent state of affairs.
Turning detentions into convictions is another sign of an
efficient enforcement policy. In Brannigan & MacBride v. UK,14 2
Judge Walsh, in a dissenting opinion concerning a terrorist case,
stated:
The government has not convincingly shown, in a situation
where the courts operate normally, why an arrested person
cannot be treated in accordance with article 5 para. 3. The
fact that out of 1,549 persons arrested in 1990 only thirty were
subsequently charged, indicates a paucity of proof rather
than deficiency in the operation of the judicial function.
Official figures recorded by the police give an indication of the
efficiency of the relevant legislation. Published arrest figures re-
lating to the Terrorism Act 2000 and the ATCSA suggest that
arrest patterns associated with previous anti-terrorism legislation
continue today. 14" For example, the Home Secretary an-
nounced that 144 arrests have been made since September 1 1th
under the Terrorism Act. No convictions for terrorist offences
141. See Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism, 1996 Cm. 3420, paras. 1.21-
1.24.
142. (1994) EUR. H.R. REI,. 539.
143. The official published figures from the Home Office, Statistics on the Operation
of the Terrorism Legislation, were published in September 2001. The data in this bulletin
includes the first seven weeks of 2001. The Terrorism Act 2000 commenced on Febrt-
ary 19, 2001, and is therefore not included. The figures that follow in the body of the
Article are gleaned from Parliamentary Answers. In 1975, Ian Gilmour, then conserva-
tive opposition spokesman, stated in the House of Commons in the renewal debate of
the Prevention of Terrorism [Temporary Provisions] Act, that "the draconian powers
have resulted in very few prosecutions . Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 892,
col. 1094.
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have been achieved. 144 Eleven people have been detained under
Part 4 of the ATCSA. Two of the eleven have left the UK volun-
tarily. 145 The nine remaining people detained since October
2001 under Part 4 of ATCSA appeared before the Special Immi-
gration Appeals Commission. The commissioners decided that
the power to detain foreign nationals only on the grounds that
they posed a risk to national security was discriminatory and
breached article 14 of the ECHR. 146 Figures on the use of the
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 similarly
show that no one has been arrested or charged under that legis-
lation. 147 A similar pattern emerges in the United States. As of
September 2002, only Zaccarias Moussaoui has been so charged
and he was arrested before the round-up commenced.148
Paddy Hillyard's authoritative study describes in detail the
publicly indefensible use to which the Prevention of Terrorism
[Temporary Provisions] Act was put.149 He states that nearly
nine out of every ten people detained under this statute on en-
tering Britain were released without any further action taken
against them. 50 There were 7,052 people detained under the
PTA in connection with Northern Ireland affairs between No-
vember 1974 and December 1991. 6,097 were released without
charge. Of the rest, 197 were charged with offenses under the
PTA, 411 were charged under other legislation and 349 were ex-
cluded from Britain. Of those charged under the PTA, three-
quarters were found guilty. Of these, over half received non-cus-
todial sentences and of those who went to prison, the majority
were sentenced to one year or less. Of those who were prose-
144. Most have been charged under Section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which is
a trawling section: "A person commits an offence if he possesses an article in circum-
stances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose
connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism." Id.
145. Hansard, House of CommonsJuly 18, 2002, col. 553W and Hansard, House of
Lords, May 7, 2002, col. WAI60.
146. SeeA & ORS v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, July 30, 2002, Itl 1/8/2002
(unreported elsewhere).
147. Hansard, House of Commons, 25 June 1999, col. 471.
148. As of April 2002, government officials stated that out of the 2,000 detainees in
the United States, 10 or II may be members of Al Qaeda. Cole, supra n.72.
149. PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY (1993). Cole produces figures which
show that the U.S. authorities are using the PATRIOT Act in a similar manner: low
level intelligence gathering from the "Suspect Community" - the Arabs. Cole, supra
n.72.
150. HILLYARD, supra n.149.
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cuted under other legislation three-quarters were found guilty.
Of this group, forty-two percent received non-custodial
sentences, twelve percent were sentenced to less than one year in
prison, and thirty-five percent to over five years.' 5 ' He concludes
that the principal aim of the ordinary criminal justice system was
to take some formal action against those suspected of being in-
volved in a crime. On the other hand, the main objective of the
PTA was to gather intelligence.
The impact of anti-terrorist legislation on innocent people
swept up by that law and those empowered to enforce it, is nega-
tive, painful, and invariably alienating. Hillyard's research in-
cludes interviewing 115 people about their experiences in rela-
tion to the PTA 1974. Each person has a story of grief, disillu-
sionment, anger or frustration to tell, some more dramatic than
others do. One standard illustration is that of a person detained
for four days and then released without charge stated: "after the
detention I was off work for six or seven weeks. I was like a wreck
... You always think they're watching." 152 This social alienation
thesis is further supported in the Northern Ireland context by
Hewitt and McVeigh,' 53 who suggest that the abrasive implemen-
tation of emergency legislation created a situation among the
Nationalist community that allowed terrorists to operate with the
awareness, if not support, of large sections of the public. Hewitt,
drawing upon statistical information suggesting that "increasing
repression did not lower the level of terrorist violence" and also
upon anecdotal material on the impact of mass house searches,
stated that "heavy handed repression is counterproductive."'' 54
The social confidence and perceived safety of Muslims and
Arabs has also declined since September 11 th. The Runnymede
Trust reported that the issues of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim
151. Id. at 92.
152. Id. at 240. One of the author's Irish law students was stopped at the port of
Holyhead, Wales, on returning to Cardiff University from Northern Ireland. He was
detained for four hours, questioned, and searched. He was questioned about the aca-
demic reading in his bag and his "civil liberties" syllabus was taken from him and photo-
copied.
153. See generally CHRISTOPHER HEwrir, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TERRORIST POL-
ICIES (1984); ROBBIE MCVEIGH, 'ITS PART OF LIFE HERE': THE SECURITY FORCES AND HAR-
ASSMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1994).
154. HEWI'r, supra n.153, at 94.
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prejudice have become tragically more prominent. 155  The
events in the United States produced further expressions of ra-
cism in the UK. 1 6 There is evidence that national newspapers
are seeking to categorize as one both asylum seekers and ter-
rorists. 157 Currently, despite conflicting evidence that immi-
grants constitute a net gain to national productivity, 151 the Na-
tionality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002159 offers little to
those seeking to enter and stay in this country, and more to
those xenophobes who seek to benefit by conflating the terms
"foreigner" and "terrorist."')'
155. Islamophobia, Runnymede Trust Report, available at http://www.runnymedetrust.
org.
156. It is important to note that criminal acts of racism are ongoing and preceded
September 1 th. See ADDRESSING PREJUDICE AND ISLAMOPHOBIA (2991). However some
illustrations immediately post 9/1 I are found in the media. See Racist Wave of Hate En-
gulfs Islamic Targets, TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001; Muslim Community Refuses to be Victims of Ra-
cism, OBSERVER, Sept. 30, 2001; We are terrfied, say Moslems, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 22, 2001;
Mosque Attacked, GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 2001; A Bad Time to Asian in Britain, TIMES, Sept.
17, 2001; European Muslims Under Attack, TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001; His girl died in New York
... but HE is hate attacked, SUN, Sept. 21, 2001.
157. The largest-selling tabloid, SUN,Jan. 20, 2003, printed a series of claims under
the headline "Asylum Meltdown" and urged: "Read this and get angry... Britain is now a
Trojan horse for terrorism .. .While Tony Blair tries to convince us to go to war with
Iraq we have an open invitation to terrorists to live off our benefits." Id.
158. Heather Stewart, Unlocking Fortress Britain, GUARDIAN, May 21, 2002, which
quotes Home Office research that states that immigrants contributed UK £31.2 billion
in taxes in the financial year 1999-2000, but increased government expenditure by less,
or UK £28.8 billion. It concludes: "Migrants reduced the amount that the existing pop-
ulation paid in taxes." Id.
159. It received Royal Assent on November 7, 2002.
160. Such people could seize upon the words of politicians, such as the Conserva-
tive leader, lain Duncan Smith, in the House of Commons, during Prime Minister's
question time, who on January 15, 2003 said that there was a need to ensure borders
were secure to "stop terrorists abusing the asylum process." Terror Arrests Prompts Asylum
Questions, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uLk/I/hi/uLk_politics/
2660737.stm. See Statement by Dr.R.Stone, Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia,
London, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 27, 2001:
There is, however, growing fear among Muslim communities, following a se-
ries of attacks on individuals and places of worship. It will take a huge effort of
national will to resist the discriminatory logic of those who conduct and con-
done such violence. All people need to take care with language, for example,
avoiding loaded words like "crusade," "Islamic terrorist" and "civilized/uncivi-
lized world."
Id. Fazil Kawani, Communications Director of the Refugee Council, said: "These [news-
paper] reports give the impression that all asylum seekers are terrorists or criminals.
We would urge the media to recognize that the overwhelming majority of asylum seek-
ers do not engage in any criminal activity." Steven Morris, Press Whips up Asylum Hyste-
ria, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2003.
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CONCLUSION
It is argued that the normal balance that exists between the
executive, legislature, and the judiciary is upset in times of na-
tional emergency. The judiciary becomes somewhat cautious
about challenging the case presented by the State."' The tradi-
tional position of the judiciary is classically presented by Lord
Diplock:
National security is the responsibility of the executive govern-
ment, what action is needed to protect its interests is ... com-
mon sense itself dictates, a matter upon which those upon
whom the responsibility rests, and not courts of justice, must
have the last word. It is par excellence a non-justicable ques-
tion. Thejudicial process is totally inept to deal with the type
of problems which it involves.' 2
More recently, in Home Sec'y v. Rehman,"'M Lord Hoffman said
that the attacks in the United States "underline the need for the
judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers
of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist
activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national se-
curity." The Court of Appeal followed this statement when con-
sidering the Home Secretary's ban on the leader of the Nation
of Islam, Louis Farrakhan, from entering the UK. The court de-
clared that it was a matter where it is "appropriate to accord a
particularly wide margin of discretion to the Secretary of
161. See Maura Dolan & Henry Weinstein, America Attacked: Preservation of Princi-
ples, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at Al. Professor Keane, Dean of the Golden Gate Uni-
versity Law School, predicted that 'judges would be more willing to grant wiretap au,-
thorizations, search warrants and other types of 4th Amendment intrusions. Judges
tend to be stampeded in times of danger like this." Id. Hussein Ibish, spokesman for
the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Washington, said that they had re-
ports of Arab-American lawyers urging clients to find other lawyers "because of the way
they feel they are being perceived by judges" since September 11 th. See also William
Glaberson, Arab-Americans See Hazards in Courtrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001.
162. Council of Civ. Service Unions v. Minister of the Civ. Service, AC 374 (1985).
See also Lord Parker in The Zamora, [1916] 2 AC 77, at 107." Those who are responsi-
ble for the national security must be the solejudge of what national security requires. It
would obviously be undesirable that such matters be made the subject of evidence in a
court of law or otherwise discussed in public." Id.
163. [2001] UKHL 47, [2002] 1 AIl.E.R. 122. See aLo, Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S.
214, 236 (1944), where the leading civil libertarian, Mr. Justice Hugo Black, wrote the
lead Supreme Court opinion upholding the constitutionality of the relocation ofJapa-
nese Americans during World War 11.
9/11: USA AND UK
State."' 64
However, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, has re-
sponded directly to the events arising from September 11th. He
addressed the "pressures created by the need to protect this
country from the merciless acts of international terrorists." He
added that it was almost inevitable that, from time to time,
under these pressures "parliament or the government will not
strike the correct balance between the rights of society as a
whole and the rights of the individual." He placed significant
value on the power of the Human Rights Act to "strengthen our
democracy by giving each member of the public the right to seek
the help of the courts to protect his or her human rights in a
manner that was not previously available."' 65 It is to be hoped
that this statement heralds a new dawn for judicial activism when
faced with issues arising out of national security and emergency,
because of the developing jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Act. However, the authors of a leading text dealing with this sub-
ject matter wrote:
... anyone taking even a tally-sheet approach to judicial deci-
sion making must be struck by the consistency of results in
the cases . . . in virtually all of them the executive emerged
victorious. Statistical randomness cannot explain so striking a
pattern, and it is highly unlikely that all the unsuccessful liti-
gants were asserting fanciful claims or suffered from poor
representation. 6"
The legislature may be pushed into hasty and ill-considered
action. In addition, legislation passed as a consequence of the
reputedly short-term, but nevertheless altered balance, has a dis-
turbing history of creeping into the realm of political and public
164. R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't ex parle Louis Farrakhan, EWCA Civ.
606, (2002) 3 WLR 481.
165. Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf, Human Rights: Have the Public Benefited
(Thank-Offering to Britain Fund Lecture, British Academy, Oct. 15, 2002). See Branni-
gan & McBride v. UK, (1994) EUR. H.R. REP. 539 (dissenting judgment ofJudge Pettiti),
stating: "If the judiciary is to continue to play its central role tinder the common law
system in upholding the rule of law, it is crucial that it should not only be rigorously
independent of the Executive, including the police, and the prosecuting authority, but
that it should be seen to be independent.").
166. LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NArIONAL SECURITY
AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRAcY 320 (1994). Note the date of publication is prior to the
introduction of the Human Rights Act 2000.
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acceptance and ultimately, becoming permanent. 167 The mind-
set of those employed to enforce such legislation cannot but be
influenced by such radical powers and expectations of the public
for high profile results. Thus, there is a consequential expan-
sion and hardening of State powers in the domains of social con-
trol and criminal law.
It is argued that those at greatest personal risk from ill-con-
ceived and enthusiastically enforced legislation are the weakest
and most vulnerable in society: immigrants, asylum seekers, non-
citizens, ethnic minorities, Muslims,' 8 and the Irish. Anti-terror-
ist legislation does not make us safe, though it may offer a de-
gree of comfort to "middle England." The price for this comfort
is the establishment of dual criminal law structures of police
powers, court processes, and prison detentions. It also includes
the possible loss of confidence in the rule of law from law-abid-
ing people who feel victimized by an incorrectly presumed asso-
ciation with terrorists.
The rule of law, equality, proportionality and fairness are
challenged by terrorists and also by ill-conceived carte blanche ter-
rorist legislation. The police and the security services cannot be
allowed a complete license through law to tackle terrorists. The
European Court of Human Rights has laid down limits: "The
Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermin-
ing or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending
it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of
the struggle against terrorism, adopt what measures they deem
appropriate."" 9 Thus, while terrorism is a threat to democracy,
the legislative responses of Nation States and the European
Union, may carry similar dangers. In the particularly sensitive
area of responses to terrorism, it is incumbent upon politicians
that their executive and legislative decisions be considered, pro-
portionate, time-restricted, and appropriate, and also, that both
content and process accord with the principles of the rule of law.
Neither the PATRIOT Act nor the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act satisfy these basic criteria. Should this argument fail
167. Joe Sim & Philip A. Thomas, The Prevention of Terrorism Act: Nornalising the
Abnormal, J. OF L. & Soc. 71 (1983).
168. Hate crimes surged in the United States against Muslims and Arabs after
Septemer 11 th. There was a jump of 1,600 percent. The FBI stated that most incidents
involved assaults and intimidation. INT'L HEIRAL TRIIOJNE, Nov. 26, 2002.
169. Klass v. Germany, EUR. H.R. REI,. 214 (1978).
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to convince, as has been the case to date, then the alternative,
supporting argument of effectiveness is offered. There is scant
evidence that anti-terrorist legislation works to control terrorism.
Even the suggestion that it is merely symbolic17 is misleading,
for positive damage occurs to the fabric of society and to the
rights of individuals, especially vulnerable minorities.' 7 ' In addi-
tion, the commitment to social justice appears hollow as is the
maintenance of a single and standardized legal system.
In 1993, a senior Labour politician stated in Parliament:
If we cravenly accept that any action by the government and
entitled Prevention of Terrorism Act must be supported in its
entirety without question, we do not strengthen the fight
against terrorism, we weaken it. I hope that no Honorable
Member will say that we do not have the right to challenge
powers, to make sure that they are in accordance with the
civil liberties of our country.
The speaker? The former Shadow Home Secretary and current
Prime Minister, Tony Blair.7 2
170. JOSEPH GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1986).
171. JAMES DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFIC-
ING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2002); Samuel R. Gross &
Debra Livingstone, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002).
172. Hansard, House of Commons, Mar. 10, 1993, col. 975.
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